2015
Proceedings

Annual ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law
May 20th, 3:00 PM

Measuring Hacking Ability Using a Conceptual Expertise Task
Justin S. Giboney
School of Business, University at Albany, jgiboney@albany.edu

Jeffrey G. Proudfoot
Information and Process Management, Bentley University, jproudfoot@bentley.edu

Sanjay Goel
School of Business, University at Albany, goel@albany.edu

Joseph S. Valacich
Eller College of Management, The University of Arizona, jsvalacich@cmi.arizona.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/adfsl
Part of the Aviation Safety and Security Commons, Computer Law Commons, Defense and Security
Studies Commons, Forensic Science and Technology Commons, Information Security Commons,
National Security Law Commons, OS and Networks Commons, Other Computer Sciences Commons, and
the Social Control, Law, Crime, and Deviance Commons

Scholarly Commons Citation
Giboney, Justin S.; Proudfoot, Jeffrey G.; Goel, Sanjay; and Valacich, Joseph S., "Measuring Hacking Ability
Using a Conceptual Expertise Task" (2015). Annual ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and
Law. 8.
https://commons.erau.edu/adfsl/2015/wednesday/8

This Peer Reviewed Paper is brought to you for free and
open access by the Conferences at Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Annual ADFSL
Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law by an
authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For
more information, please contact commons@erau.edu.

(c)ADFSL

MEASURING HACKING ABILITY USING A CONCEPTUAL
EXPERTISE TASK
Justin Scott Giboney
School of Business
University at Albany
Albany, NY 12222
jgiboney@albany.edu

Jeffrey Gainer Proudfoot
Information and Process Management
Bentley University
Waltham, MA 02452
jproudfoot@bentley.edu

Sanjay Goel
School of Business
University at Albany
Albany, NY 12222
goel@albany.edu

Joseph S. Valacich
Eller College of Management
The University of Arizona
Tucson, AZ 85721
jsvalacich@cmi.arizona.edu
ABSTRACT

Hackers pose a continuous and unrelenting threat to organizations. Industry and academic researchers
alike can benefit from a greater understanding of how hackers engage in criminal behavior. A limiting
factor of hacker research is the inability to verify that self-proclaimed hackers participating in research
actually possess their purported knowledge and skills. This paper presents current work in developing and
validating a conceptual-expertise based tool that can be used to discriminate between novice and expert
hackers. The implications of this work are promising since behavioral information systems researchers
operating in the information security space will directly benefit from the validation of this tool.
Keywords: hacker ability, conceptual expertise, skill measurement

1. INTRODUCTION
Governments, businesses, universities and other
organizations are prime targets for hackers. A
common motive for hackers to target these
organizations is data theft [1] which results in
billions of dollars of losses annually [2]. Due to
the threat that hackers pose to organizations,
researchers have been encouraged to investigate
hacker motives and behavior [3]. There have been
recent attempts to further understand hacker
behavior e.g., [2], [4], [5]. However, these studies
rely on data collected from self-reported hackers.
Respondents can pose as hackers due to gain the
incentives provided during data collection. It is
unverifiable whether the samples utilized in prior
research are based on data collected from actual
hackers or whether these samples are based on
data collected from persons misrepresenting their

hacking abilities and experience. A consequence
of this uncertainty is the questionable validity and
generalizability of the findings reported in prior
hacking research.
A second issue is the tendency for researchers to
lump all hackers into a single category during data
analysis. This is typically done as a means of
comparing hackers to other groups, but previous
research indicates that there is more than one type
of hacker [6]. Categories of hackers include: script
kiddies, petty thieves, virus writers, professional
criminals, and government agents [6], [7].
Furthermore, the motivations and skill levels of
different types of hackers are varied [6]. In light of
these differences, hacking researchers would
benefit tremendously from the ability to more
accurately measure each hacker’s level of skill.
The ability to measure hacking skill would allow

researchers to verify that a self-proclaimed hacker
indeed possesses requisite technical skills. It
would also allow analyses to be conducted on
subsets of data for different groups of hackers
based on their level of skill and areas of expertise.
In short, there is currently no scientific measure
that can be used to assess hacking skill level
without employing qualitative research methods
(e.g., interviews) [8]. While effective, qualitative
methods are much less scalable than survey-based
methods as surveys can be administered widely
with few temporal or geographic limitations.
Furthermore, hacking activities often require
behavior that is criminal in nature; a survey-based
methodology for data collection may elicit a more
candid response from a participant since the
identity of the respondent can remain anonymous.
The goal of this research is to develop a surveybased methodology for determining a hacker’s
skill level using an 18-scenario scale. If a scale can
be developed to measure a hacker’s skill level,
researchers can (1) more accurately discriminate
between categories of hackers, (2) more accurately
quantify who is a hacker and who is not, and (3)
provide evidence that their findings are indeed
generalizable to the population of interest.
The scale development process used for this
research is in accordance with recognized scale
development protocols [9] and is based on
measuring conceptual expertise, an approach
previously utilized by researchers in a variety of
disciplines [10], [11]. Upon completing scale
development, this research proposes to collect and
analyze data to validate the accuracy of the
measurement tool. This paper presents an
overview of the scale development process
concerning the validity of this novel approach to
measuring hacker ability.
2. SCALE DEVELOPMENT
There are six recommended phases used for scale
development:
1)
conceptualization,
2)
development of measures, 3) model specification,
4) scale evaluation and refinement, 5) validation,
and 6) norm development [9]. Each of these steps
is discussed in the following sections.
2.1 Conceptualization

The goal of the conceptualization phase is to
provide a precise definition of the construct of
interest and establish conceptual arguments for
how the construct can be discriminated from
previously-specified and evaluated constructs
found in literature [9]. This paper introduces
hacking conceptual expertise as a new construct
based on the conceptual expertise construct found
in cognitive science literature [10], [12]. Hacking
conceptual expertise is comparable to, and should
distinguish from, two similar constructs: computer
self-efficacy [13] and computer ability [14]. This
section will first discuss expertise before
addressing computer self-efficacy and computer
ability.
Expertise is a “manifestation of skills and
understanding resulting from the accumulation of
a large body of knowledge” [12, p. 167]. A
hacker’s expertise is manifested in their ability to
write code or scripts that can circumvent security
protocols, disrupt the intended functions of a
system, collect valuable information, and not get
caught [6]. Many hackers are novices, sometimes
referred to as “script kiddies”, who have only a
surface understanding of hacking but still employ
software and scripts written by experts to perform
their attacks [6], [15]. Expert hackers understand
hacking at a deeper level as they have a command
of the common weaknesses and vulnerabilities of
information systems. Therefore, we formally
define the construct hacking conceptual expertise
as the manifestation of skills and understanding
about circumventing security protocols, disrupting
the intended functions of systems, collecting
valuable information, and not getting caught.
Computer self-efficacy is a similar construct to
hacking conceptual expertise and is based on
Social Cognitive Theory (SCT). SCT explains
that social pressures, context, cognitive and
personal characteristics, and behavior are
reciprocally determined. [13], [16]. Self-efficacy is
part of the cognitive and personal characteristics
that drive behavior [13], [17]. Self-efficacy is a
belief people have about their capacity to perform
an action and their skill at performing the action
[13], [17]. According to SCT, people are more
likely to act if they believe that there will be
positive outcomes as a result of their action [13],
[17]. If people believe that they are good at an
action, they are more likely to believe that they

will receive a positive outcome by performing the
action, and therefore, will be more likely to
perform the action [13], [17]. Computer selfefficacy is the belief people have about their
capacity to perform actions that accomplish a
computer-based task [13]. Computer self-efficacy
has three main components: magnitude, strength,
and generalizability [13]. Magnitude refers to the
perception that people can accomplish more
difficult tasks [13]. Strength refers to the
confidence people have in being able to perform
the tasks [13]. Generalizability refers to the extent
to which a person’s judgments include multiple
activities [13].

Experts perform tasks better than novices as they
have superior mental representations of problems;
this is attributable to larger quantities of stored
information and solution nodes (i.e., steps to
achieve the solution) [10]. In other words, experts
have more strategies at their disposal to find
solutions to problems as compared with novices.
Due to larger quantities of stored information,
experts typically organize information into
abstract categories [10]. Abstract categories are
used to filter tasks and potential solutions; they
allow experts to more quickly and efficiently solve
problems [10]. These abstract categories form the
basis for testing expertise.

Another similar measure to hacking conceptual
expertise is computer ability [14]. Computer
ability is based on two concepts: how important a
skill is to a task and the perceived skill level of the
individual in performing a task [14]. This research
will demonstrate that hacking conceptual expertise
is both distinct from and an antecedent to
computer self-efficacy and computer ability.

The abstract categorization of experts can be
leveraged to distinguish between experts and
novices. When given a set of related problems
(e.g., end of chapter questions in a textbook) and
asked to group the problems, experts will rely on
their abstract categories to organize the problems
based on principles of the domain [12]. When
novices are given the same task, however, they
will organize the problems based on physical
evidence, explicit words, or formulas [12]. For
example, in a study distinguishing between expert
and novice programmers, experts sorted
programming problems by solution algorithms and
novices sorted the same problems by application
areas [22].

2.2 Development of Measures
Measurement development is a process
traditionally completed in two steps. First, a set of
items that represent the construct is generated, and
second, the content validity of the set of items is
assessed [9]. Before discussing the generation of
items, this paper will first discuss how these items
will be used in a specialized task to measure
hacker conceptual expertise rather than using a
traditional survey.
2.2.1 The Conceptual Expertise Task
When people solve problems they approach tasks
based on the mental representation they have of
the problem [10], [18]. Their mental
representations are based on stored information
(memories) that assist in knowledge-based
decisions [19]. People use stored information as
nodes (or waypoints) that allow them to follow a
solution path [20], [21]. Therefore, problem
solvers use the mental representations they have of
the task to find a solution. For example, chess
masters can identify more ways to achieve
checkmate (where the nodes are necessary moves)
than novice chess players.

Researchers can capitalize on this difference
between experts and novices (abstract categories
versus physical evidence) to create a scoring
system to measure expertise [10], [11]. To create
this scoring system, underlying principles from the
domain of expertise are derived from literature,
textbooks, and other related sources. These
underlying principles are termed deep features as
they show understanding of a given domain (e.g.,
social engineering). Deep features are contrasted
with surface features that are the objects or
contexts (e.g., stealing financial data) represented
in a problem [10]. When participants group deep
features together more often than they group
surface features, the participants are considered
experts. When participants group surface features
together more often than they group deep features,
the participants are considered novices.
The conceptual knowledge task is typically
performed using a card sort of relevant scenarios



on 3x5 cards with each card having one deep
feature and one surface feature [11]. An example
of a scenario with a deep feature of system
resource consumption and a surface feature of
financial data is as follows:

Create a name for your groups

Table 2 provides an example of how a participant
might group the scenarios. Once grouped,
researchers can score the pairings of every
combination in each group to classify it as a
Eve sends out requests to millions
surface feature pair (S), a deep feature pair (D), or
of machines using an IP address
an unexpected pair (U). For example, the pair P-G
assigned to a server at a stock
in the participant’s first group is a surface feature
brokerage.
pair as both scenarios are in the “usernames and
passwords” column. The pair L-I in the
While this is an example of a scenario that could
participant’s second group is a deep feature pair as
be displayed on one card, assume that a researcher
both scenarios are in the “input validation” row.
creates 18 cards lettered A-R, each possessing a
The pair F-E in the participant’s third group is an
unique hacking-related scenario containing a deep
unexpected pair as the two scenarios are neither in
feature and a surface feature. The hypothesized
the same row nor the same column. In total, this
groupings could look something like Table 1.
participant identified 6 deep pairings, 12 surface
Participants, without seeing Table 1 or knowing
pairings, and 18 unexpected pairings. This
the hypothesized features, are asked to sort the
participant is likely more novice than expert as he
cards into groups with the following restrictions:
or she identified more surface features than deep
 You must create more than one group
features. However, the participant could have
 Each group must have at least 2 cards and
created an even higher number of surface feature
pairs, thus he or she is likely not a complete
fewer than 15 cards
novice.
 Each card can only be a part of 1 group
Table 1 Example problem matrix

Hypothesized deep features

Hypothesized surface features
Fake website

Usernames and
passwords

Financial data

Authentication/
Authorization

H

D

O

Hiding tracks

F

N

A

Input validation/ Memory
override

Q

J

E

Resource consumption

M

P

R

Social engineering

K

G

C

Vulnerability detection

B

L

I

2.2.2 Generating items for the hacking
conceptual expertise task
The next step in scale development is to “generate
a set of items that fully represent the conceptual

domain of the construct” [9, p. 304]. For the
conceptual expertise task, the generation of items
begins with the identification of deep features.
Previous researchers using the conceptual
expertise task have used textbook problems to

identify deep features see [10], [11]. As
features for the hacking conceptual exercise. Table
information security textbooks do not typically
3 contains a thorough, but not exhaustive, list of
provide information on how to engage in criminal
vulnerabilities and security measures identified in
hacking behavior, we relied on both information
the set of textbooks and relevant literature used for
security textbooks and academic literature
this study [1], [4], [6], [8], [23]–[40].
addressing hacking scenarios to generate deep
Table 2 Example participant grouping result
Group 1 – Hacks that involve numerous targets
P, O, M, J, Q, G, D
Group 2 – Hacks that involve hacker input
N, L, A, I
Group 3 – Hacks that involve pretending to be someone else or pretending to do something good
F, E, B, R
Group 4 – Hacks that involve programming
K, H, C

Table 3 Hacks, vulnerabilities, and security measures referenced in relevant literature
Authentication/Authorization

Encryption, Security tokens, Permissions, Password cracking, Two-step
commit, Certificate authorities, Password salting, Keystroke logging,
Rainbow tables, Brute force attacks

Hiding tracks

Malware signatures, Removing log files, Audit-disabling software,
Disabling security controls, Using proxies, IP spoofing, Steganography

Input validation/Memory
override

Buffer overflow, Cross-site scripting, Maladvertising, SQL injection,
Heap spraying, Format string attacks, Dangling pointers

Resource consumption

Denial of service attacks, Syn flood, ACK storm, Email bombs, HTTP
POST DDOS, Smurf attacks, Spamming

Social engineering

Spear Phishing, Pharming, Nigerian scam, Phishing

Vulnerability detection

Man in the middle attacks, Port scanning, Ping sweeps, Packet sniffing,
Network mapping, War driving, Bluesnarfing

Actions/Outcomes

Electronic espionage, Zombie networks, Spyware, Website defacement,
Computer worms, Trojan horses, Root kits, Ransomware, Leak of
information, Bot net, Trap doors, Logic bombs

A careful review of the hacks, vulnerabilities, and
security measures identified in relevant literature
allowed us to organize seven principles of hacking
that form the basis for our deep features. In the
next section we will empirically test and validate
the categorization of these hacking principles. It is
worth noting that the last category titled

“Actions/Outcomes” in Table 3 does not contain
hacking techniques, but rather contains outcomes
of hacking activities. This category was not
considered ideal for evaluating a person’s ability
to carry out a hacking attempt, but rather how well
someone knows about hacking activities in
general, therefore, it was excluded from our final

set of deep features. For the conceptual expertise
task, deep features are coupled with their
corresponding surface features to create a matrix.
We created three areas of surface features, namely
financial
data,
fake
websites,
and
usernames/passwords, to correspond with six deep
features. Table 4 contains the 18 scenarios
resulting from the use of the features contained in
the matrix. Recall that Table 1 contains the matrix
depicting how the deep features are crossed with
the surface features.
2.2.3 Assessing Content Validity
Before using this task to discriminate between
novice and expert hackers, the items must first be
scientifically validated. The validation process will

be completed using two approaches. First, expert
information security practitioners and academics
will review our proposed methodology and
provide feedback. Second, the scenarios presented
in Table 4 will be empirically validated using an
item-ranking task. We have already compiled
feedback on the hacking conceptual expertise task
proposed in this paper; feedback was solicited
from four security experts with either an industry
or academic background. The general consensus
of the polled experts is that this is a feasible
approach for discriminating between expert and
novice hackers. A common concern is that our
approach may only measure how well a hacker
conceptually understands hacking methods
without directly assessing a hacker’s actual ability.

Table 4 Hacking conceptual expertise scenarios
Hack

#

Scenario

Removing log files

A

Eve deletes log files as she combs through a compromised machine looking
for tax returns.

Port scanning

B

Eve uses a malicious website to scan for open ports of visitors.

Phishing

C

Eve, pretending to be a bank website, emails Kelly asking for her bank
information.

Rainbow tables

D

Eve uses a rainbow table to decrypt secret military intranet links.

SQL injection

E

Eve uses a semicolon in a web form to access user account balances in the
database.

Using proxies

F

Eve uses a proxy while creating a website to create a zombie network

Nigerian scam

G

Certificate authority

H

Man-in-the-middle
attack
Improper file
validation

I
J

Pharming

K

Ping sweep

L

HTTP POST DOS
attack
Malware signature
avoidance

M
N

Password salting

O

Email DOS

P

Eve sends Twitter messages en masse asking people to click on an Internet
link in return for some secret information.
Eve becomes her own certificate authority as she creates a fictitious ecommerce business.
Eve captures Wi-Fi network traffic from a conference to watch for financial
transactions.
Eve uploads an executable to a server expecting an image, the executable
sends out instant messages with Internet links to random email addresses.
Eve creates a website similar to a well-known company using a similar
domain name.
Eve sends a ping to networked machines and then sends an Internet link as
a message to live machines.
Eve creates fake websites that post to a targeted website normally, but that
are extremely slow (e.g. 1 byte/110 seconds).
Eve has created a virus to look for Internet links to sensitive data stored on
a computer that changes itself after every install.
Eve is attempting to figure out the salt that was used for some financial
transactions.
Eve created a script to send hundreds of emails with an Internet link using

fake email addresses to a particular company leader.
Cross-site scripting

Q

Smurf attack

R

Eve posts a response on a forum that allows Eve to redirect users to a
malicious website.
Eve sends out requests to millions of machines using the IP address of the
server of a stock trading institution.

More specifically, one of the security experts
stated that deep features “…are more clear cut
than the surface features.” Another security expert
suggested that the deep pairings may be too
intuitive. However, we do not consider these
responses to be troubling as experts should
consider deep features to be both clear and
intuitive. We take these comments as a sign that
the measurement method is well specified.

Upon incorporating this feedback into a new set of
items, we will empirically validate the items by
selecting 20 new security experts from a state
information security team. To empirically validate
the items, each item should be adequately
representative of the deep feature to which it is
assigned [9], [41], [42]. Mackenzie et al. [9]
recommended a technique suggested by Hinkin
and Tracey [43] in which a matrix is created with
the items in the first column and the deep features
listed as column headers. The matrix is then
distributed to raters who are asked to rate how
well each item fits with each column header on a
five-point Likert-type scale (1 = not at all; 5 =
completely). Table 5 contains a hypothetical
example of the matrix that we will use. Data
collection for both of these approaches is currently
underway. Preliminary findings from both
approaches will be reported at the conference.

There were a number of other requests from the
security experts that we will incorporate in the
next iteration of the measurement tool. For
example, one security expert suggested that we
include script kiddie scenarios that reference the
use of existing prepackaged tools. Another
security expert suggested that we include more
hardware exploits.

Table 5 Hypothetical example of item rating task
Rater # = 001
Authentication
/Authorization

Hiding
tracks

Input
validation
/Memory
override

Eve deletes log
files as she combs
through a
compromised
machine looking for
tax returns.

1

5

1

2

1

2

Eve uses a
malicious website
to scan for open
ports of visitors.

1

1

1

2

2

4

…

…

…

…

…

…

…

Eve sends out
requests to millions
of machines using
the IP address of

2

1

1

4

1

2

Resource
consumption

Social
engineering

Vulnerability
detection

the server of a
stock trading
institution.

2.3 Model Specification
The next phase in scale development is to specify
how the indicators capture the expected
relationships with the construct [9]. While this
stage typically involves specifying formative or
reflective indicators for a construct, the conceptual
expertise task does not treat the indicators as
formative measures in a scale, rather they are used
to calculate a single expertise score. Therefore, our
model specification will be the percentage of deep
pairs identified by a participant compared to the
percentage of surface pairs identified by the
participant.

2.4 Scale Evaluation and Refinement
Scale evaluation and refinement is a two-step
process based on (1) conducting a pilot study and
(2) modifying items in the survey. After revising
the scenarios from the feedback we receive from
experts participating in our item-validation tasks,
we will conduct a pilot study comprised of 20
security experts, 20 novices, and 20 claimed
hackers on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. Security
experts will be selected from government and
corporate information security teams with
connections to the university. Novices will be
selected from introductory Computer Science,
Informatics, or Information Systems courses. The
pilot study will allow us to further refine the scale
by adjusting the scenarios based on our results.
We will look to refine scenarios that are paired by
experts using surface features as well as scenarios
paired by novices based on deep features. We will
also look for scenarios commonly paired in
unexpected ways. The item-refinement process is
iterative and will be carried out until the scale
possesses sufficient discriminatory power.

evolve throughout the pilot-testing process, we
will conduct the main data collection with a fullsized sample. We will sample 50 security experts,
50 novices, and 50 self-identified hackers from
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.
Once the full-sized sample is collected we can
assess the scale’s validity in two ways. First, we
will be able to use a known-group comparison
method, and second, we will assess the
nomological validity of the scale. The knowngroup comparison is the use of groups (novices
and experts) that should demonstrate differences
on the scale [9]. We expect that novices will create
more surface pairings than experts, and that
novices will create less deep pairings than experts.
To assess nomological validity we will measure
how well hacking conceptual expertise relates to
similar measures. Specifically, we expect hacking
conceptual expertise to increase perceptions of
computing ability measured through computer
self-efficacy and computer ability (see Figure 1).
2.6 Norm Development
The last step in scale development is to develop
norms for the scale. This involves discovering the
distribution of the scores from different
populations. While we currently do not have plans
to create norms for this scale, we are optimistic
that this paper will serve as a foundation for
developing norms in future work.

2.5 Validation
Validation is a three-step process comprised of the
following tasks: 1) gathering data from a complete
sample, 2) assessing scale validity, and 3) crossvalidating the scale [9]. As the scenarios will

Figure 1 Measurement model

3. CONCLUSION
Hackers continue to pose a serious threat to
organizations. Security researchers can benefit
from a greater understanding of how and why
hackers engage in criminal behavior. A limiting
factor of such studies is the inability to verify that
self-proclaimed hackers participating in research
actually possess their purported knowledge and
skills. This paper presents a cogent plan to develop
and validate a conceptual-expertise based tool that
can be used to discriminate between novice and
expert hackers.
The proposed tool operates on the premise that
given a set of scenarios, experts will rely on their
understanding of abstract categories to organize
problems based on principles of the domain
whereas novices organize problems based on
physical evidence, explicit words, or formulas. In
other words, experts will group items based on
deeper features while novices will group items
based on surface features. To create a conceptualexpertise based tool for measuring hacker ability
that possesses sufficient discriminatory power,
items must first be developed and validated. We
have developed 18 scenarios and are in the process
of refining both the task and the scenarios by
soliciting feedback from information security
experts. These 18 scenarios will be a scale that can
be used in survey-based research to measure
hacker skill level. Once feedback from solicited
experts is analyzed, our model will be refined
followed iterative pilot testing and data collection.
The implications of this work are promising as
behavioral information systems researchers
operating in the information security space will
directly benefit from the validation of this tool.
Furthermore, adaptations of this tool have the
potential to be utilized in a variety of contexts and
applications in information systems research.
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